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Abstract
Corporate bonds are an attractive form of investment as they provide higher
returns than government bonds. This increase in returns is usually associated
with an increase in risk. These risks include liquidity, market and credit risk.
This dissertation will focus on the modelling of a corporate bond’s credit risk
by considering how to estimate the credit default swap (CDS) spread of a firm’s
bond. A structural credit model will be used to do this. In this dissertation,
we implement an extension of Merton’s model by Hull, Nelken and White
(2004), which is based on the use of the implied volatilities of options on the
company’s stock to estimate model parameters. Such an approach provides an
insight into the relationship between credit markets and options markets.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to credit risk
1.1 A Corporate Bond and Credit Risk
Asset managers, banks and insurers in South Africa usually invest a large per-
centage of their assets in a variety of bonds. As corporate bonds provide better
returns than government bonds, financial institutions have directed much of
their long term fixed interest investments towards them. As a result of the
increased risk associated with corporate bonds, holders of these instruments
need an understanding of the increased credit risk they are exposed to. An-
other constraint for some financial institutions is that these corporate bonds
need to be valued at fair value for accounting purposes. This means that they
need to be valued using “market” data.
To calculate the probabilities of default, we implement an extension of Mer-
ton’s structural model by Hull, Nelken and White (2004). This model allows
one to estimate the volatility of the firm’s assets from the implied volatilit-
ies of options written on the firm’s stock. This method is attractive to us as
it estimates the probability of default from market data. Once probabilities
of default are calculated using this model, we can estimate the Credit Default
Swap (CDS) spread for a name and compare the calculated spreads to observed
spreads in the market.
The structure of the dissertation will be as follows. In Section 2 we look
1.1 A Corporate Bond and Credit Risk 2
at Credit Default Swaps, their history and their features. Thereafter, we in-
troduce the two major types of credit models in Section 3 . We then discuss
structural models in detail by conducting a review of the extensions to the Mer-
ton and First Passage Time models. Following that, in Section 4 we choose the
models we will be working with and explain them in detail. We then perform
an empirical investigation in Section 5 where we evaluate the CDS spreads
for nine firms. In Section 6 we present our findings from this investigation.
Finally, we present our conclusion in Section 7.
Chapter 2
Credit Default Swaps
A Credit Default Swap or CDS transfers the credit risk associated with a bond
issued by an entity, usually a firm, from one investor to another. O’Kane and
Turnbull (2003) define a CDS as follows: “In a standard CDS contract one
party purchases credit protection from another party, to cover the loss of the
face value of an asset following a credit event. This protection lasts until some
specified maturity date. The protection is limited to a percentage of the face
value. This percentage is referred to as the recovery rate. To pay for this pro-
tection, the protection buyer makes a regular stream of payments, known as the
premium leg, to the protection seller. These payments are made until a credit
event occurs or until maturity, whichever occurs first.” The CDS spread should
not be confused with a credit spread. A credit spread is the difference in yield
between a “risk free” bond and a risky bond. To calculate the premium of the
CDS, we use the quoted swap spread. This spread would be a reflection of the
credit worthiness of the firm.
There are many sources, which differ on the origin of credit default swaps.
However, many agree that they were created in the early 1990s by JP Morgan
and Deutsche Bank. The very first CDSs were created as a way for financial
institutions, mainly banks, to indemnify themselves and their shareholders
against their exposure to large corporate bonds. The market has grown rap-
idly during the last decade from a gross notional in the low hundred billions in
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the late 1990s, to a gross notional which is close to £17 trillion today (Wilson,
2011). According to McLean and Nocera (2011), J.P. Morgan constructed its
first CDS in 1994. J.P.Morgan had a $4.8 billion line of credit exposure to
Exxon as a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. This exposure required J.P.
Morgan to tie up millions of dollars in capital, which had to be placed in re-
serve. Blythe Masters, an employee of JP Morgan, developed the idea of using
a CDS to mitigate their exposure. The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) in London agreed to cover any loan default by Exxon in
exchange for a steady fee from J.P. Morgan. The agreement provided a stream
of cash flows for the EBRD and allowed JP Morgan to remove some risk from
their balance sheet. Most European credit default swap agreements use a tem-
plate called a “master agreement”. This is the standard agreement template
written by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). We
should note that almost all CDSs are traded on the OTC market and not on
an exchange.
A CDS is triggered by a so-called credit event. The technical condition for a de-
fault is difficult to determine. To help with this problem, there are five regional
“ISDA credit determinations committees”. These committees are comprised
of banks and major credit investors. They act as the “ultimate arbiters” on
claims relating to possible credit or default events. If there is a possible claim,
the holder of the CDS would submit a claims request to the determinations
committee. The committee will first decide whether they should accept the
query. If they do, the committee will then review the claim to determine
whether the CDS should be triggered.
As the CDS market is fairly liquid in the USA and Europe, it can be used to
measure the credit quality of a name. In our case, the market CDS spreads
will be used to determine the suitability of our model. This will be done by
comparing market spreads to our model’s calculated CDS spreads. For the
remainder of this dissertation, we will focus on the 5 year CDS.
Chapter 3
Credit Risk Modelling
3.1 Credit Risk Models: Structural Versus
Intensity-Based Approach
The very first way in which credit risk was mathematically modelled is now
referred to as the structural modelling of credit risk. This first approach goes
back to the fundamental papers by Black and Scholes (1973) as well as Merton
(1974). This approach uses economic fundamentals, such as the capital struc-
ture of a company, in order to model the likelihood of a default event. Along
with this, the total value of the firm’s assets and the default triggering barrier
are the major components of the model. The firm’s assets, Vt, are modelled
by Geometric Brownian motion with the following dynamics:
dVt = Vt (rdt+ σV dWt). (3.1)
Here, Wt is standard Brownian motion. The firm’s equity, Et, is modelled
as a derivative with Vt as the underlying. In this framework, if the asset
value, VT , is insufficient to pay back the debt, the firm is considered to have
defaulted. We model this as VT crossing some default threshold barrier, D.
Usually, this default threshold, D, will coincide with the debt level of the firm.
This argument only allows for a firm to default at time T . The following
equations describe how the firm’s equity can be valued:
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ET = max(VT −D, 0). (3.2)
By the Black-Scholes equation, the initial value of the equity can be ex-
pressed as:
E0 = VtΦ(d1)−De−r(T )Φ(d2), (3.3)
where d1 and d2 are as follows
d1 =
ln
(
er(T )Vt
D
)
+ 1
2
σ2V (T )
σV
√
T
(3.4)
d2 = d1 − σV
√
T . (3.5)
Finally, the probability of default (PD) can be expressed as follows:
PDT = P [VT < D] = Φ(−d2). (3.6)
Heath, Jarrow and Morton (1992) introduced another way of modelling
credit risk. This is now known as the reduced form framework. Here, they
model the default process and how the process evolves through different stages.
The evolution of default is defined as a jump process. In this model, a firm’s
credit quality may move from states of no-default to an absorbing default state.
To extract the default intensity of a firm, these models make use of market
prices of the firm’s defaultable bonds and CDSs. This hazard rate is usually
state dependent and can be used to calculate PDs as well as the prices of other
defaultable instruments. Under these models, the capital structure of the firm
is not considered at all. Reduced form models make exclusive use of market
data, in particular, bond prices, as the only source of information regarding
the firms credit structure.
With a structural model, one can model both credit risk and equity. This
is done through linking the two through the firm’s asset value, Vt. As this
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fits in with the problem of modelling the term structure of the probability of
default from market data, structural models will be considered exclusively in
this dissertation.
3.2 Criticism and Extensions of the Merton
Model
The one major advantage (and disadvantage) of Merton’s model is that it
employs the theory of European option pricing, which was developed by Black
and Scholes in 1973. Thus, many assumptions are required to allow the theory
to hold. Assumptions were made with regard to the firm’s capital structure, the
dynamics of its asset value process as well as the interest rate term structure.
With any model, there is a trade-off between plausibility and tractability.
Merton’s model sacrifices plausibility for the sake of tractability. Following
Merton’s work, many extensions were made to this model. As these models
were made more realistic, one of the main goals was for the model to have a
closed form solution for the probability of default. These new models saw the
introduction of more realistic assumptions. Although some of these models
did not produce closed form expressions for the required probabilities, most
of them provided expressions for the probabilities which could be evaluated
using numerical methods. Some of these extensions to the original model
were presented by Merton (1974). These extensions, among others, include
stochastic interest rates, accounting for coupon bearing and callable bonds as
well as relaxing the assumption that the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds.
A major drawback of Merton’s model is that default can only occur at
maturity. By doing this, the model rules out the event of an early default.
This means that if the firm’s value falls down to levels below its liabilities
and recovers to meet its commitments at maturity, the firm will not have
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defaulted under the approach of Merton. Another problem with this model
is the assumption around a firm’s capital structure. If we consider a firm,
it would be safe to say that its capital structure is far more complex than a
simple zero-coupon bond. Geske (1977) extends the model by considering the
relationship between the liability structure of the firm and a coupon bearing
bond. Under this model, each coupon payment is treated as a compound
option. This model allows for default at each possible coupon payment. If the
firm fails to make a coupon payment, the firm is considered to have defaulted.
This accounts for the possibility of an early default. Geske also considers other
extensions to the model. These include the consideration of features such as
safety covenants, sinking funds, debt subordination and pay-out restrictions.
The relaxation of the assumption of flat term structure of interest rates
is an extension which we encounter a few times across the literature. Jones
et al. (1984) suggests that “there exists evidence that introducing stochastic
interest rates, as well as taxes, would improve the model’s performance.” With
the inclusion of stochastic interest rates, it enables the modeller to account
for correlation between assets of a firm and and the interest rates. Hsu et al.
(2003), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Ronn and Verma (1986), Briys and
De Varenne (1997) and Kim et al. (1993) have all considered the above exten-
sion.
One popular extension was related to the calibration of the Merton model.
Most of the works we reviewed used market data to calibrate the volatility of
a firm’s assets, σV . Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) use the value of the
company’s stock price along with its instantaneous volatility to estimate σV .
The most interesting approach we came across was that of Hull, Nelken and
White (2004). Their model calibration extension is based on the use of the
implied volatilities of options on the company’s equity to estimate model para-
meters. They test their model by calculating a credit spread and comparing it
to market CDS spread data. They note that using CDS spreads are an attract-
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ive alternative to the use of a bond’s credit spread. Credit spreads calculated
from a bond price, usually depend on the bond’s liquidity. To determine the
credit component of the spread, one would also need an estimate of the true
risk-free rate.
Another general extension of the Merton model was the introduction of a
jump process in the asset’s dynamics. Delianedis and Geske (2001) investigate
how the credit spread of a bond can be broken down. In particular, they focus
on the proportion of a bond’s credit spread that can be attributed to default
risk. This is done by using the frameworks provided by Merton and Geske.
Delianedis and Geske come to the conclusion that default risk only explains a
small amount of a bond’s credit spread. They show that the rest of the spread
can be explained by market risk factors, liquidity, taxes as well as jumps. To
investigate the effect of a jump process, the authors include a jump component
in the Merton model. They conclude that: “while jumps may explain a portion
of the residual spread it is unlikely that jumps can explain it entirely.”
Arora, Bohn and Zhua (2006) empirically compare two structural models,
the basic Merton and Vasicek-Kealhofer (VK) as well as one reduced-form
model. To investigate the relative merits of each model, they test the ability of
each model to predict spreads in the CDS market. Built on the original insights
of Black-Scholes-Merton, Vasicek and Kealhofer developed a straightforward
variant of the Merton model. Arora et al. employ the commercial adaptation
of the VK model by Moody’s KMV. They find that the VK model outperforms
the other two models when it comes to predicting CDS spreads.
Zhang et al. (2009) provide a model to determine CDS spreads. Their
model is a stylized structural model, which is used to interpret the observed
effects of volatility and jump risks on credit spreads. They calibrate four
nested models: A Merton model, a jump-diffusion, a stochastic volatility and
jump-diffusion stochastic volatility model. They find that the model which
incorporates both jump-diffusion and stochastic volatility is the best predictor
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of observed CDS spreads. It should be noted that all of these models provided
spreads, which are lower than the observed spreads in the market.
3.3 First Passage Time Models
Black and Cox (1976) introduced the original First Passage Model (FPM).
This was the result of a natural extension to the Merton model. Black and
Cox (1976) extended the model to allow for the case when a particular firm
may default at any time and not only at the maturity date of the debt. Under
the measure Q we assume the assets follow the same dynamics as described in
the previous section:
dVt = Vt(rdt+ σV dWt). (3.7)
We also assume that there exists a lower level of the firm’s asset value such
that if the firm’s assets fall below this level, it defaults. We assume that this
default barrier is constant. Conditional on default not having occurred yet
(Vt > D), the time of default at time t = 0 is given by:
τ = inf [s ≥ t|Vs ≤ D] . (3.8)
Following the reflection principle properties of Brownian motion Wt, it can
be shown that the default probability from time t to time T can be expressed
as:
PD(t) = P [τ ≤ T |τ ≥ t] = Φ(h1) + exp
[
2
σ2V
(
r − σ
2
V
2
ln
(
D
VT
))]
Φ(h2),
(3.9)
where
h1 =
ln
(
D
er(T−t)Vt
)
+ 1
2
σ2V (T − t)
σV
√
T − t (3.10)
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and
h2 = h1 − σV
√
T − t. (3.11)
3.4 First Passage Time Models: Extensions
and Criticisms
There have been many extensions made to the original works of Black and Cox
(1976). Elizalde (2006) provides a review of most of these extensions. These
extensions include: time-dependent and stochastic default barriers, stochastic
interest rates, jumps in the asset value process, allowing for a strategic de-
fault, taxes and debt subordination. Naturally, these extensions make the
model more realistic. The major downside is that they increase the models
analytical complexity. First Passage Time models are known to be analytic-
ally complex and this complexity is increased even further if we consider some
of the extensions in the list mentioned above. This mathematical complexity
associated with First Passage Time models makes it difficult for one to obtain
a closed form expression for the value of the default probability. As a result
of this drawback, one would usually resort to numerical methods to solve for
the default probabilities.
Although many empirical tests have been carried out on structural models
and FPM models, in general, they have not yielded much success. Eom, Hel-
wege and Huang (2004) carried out a review of five models (Collin-Dufresne
and Goldstein, Merton, Leland and Toft, Longstaff and Schwartz, and Geske).
The authors perform an empirical analysis on these models. Eom, Helwege
and Huang (2004) find that these five structural bond pricing models produce
prices, which are not consistent with corporate bond prices in the market. The
authors also indicate that difficulties are not limited to the under-prediction
of spreads. In particular, the authors note the dispersion of predicted spreads
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by the various models.
Another major criticism of these structural models we discussed above is
the so-called predictability of defaults. Elizalde (2006) states that the process
which drives the asset value of a firm under the FPM model does not allow for
a sudden default. He argues that sudden defaults are sometimes observed in
the market. He also states that the model has almost a zero probability of a
sudden default. A major reason why these FPM models produce small short-
term credit spreads is due to the problems associated with “predictability of
default” described above. These short-term credit spreads produced by FPM
models are thus inconsistent with the spreads observed in the market. In
the market, we usually observe that short-term credit spreads are far higher
than those calculated by a FPM model. This can be explained by the fact
that the market incorporates the possibility of unexpected default or a sudden
deterioration in the firm’s credit quality. It should be noted that the same
properties of these structural models that make default predictable also make
recovery predictable.
In most structural models, when a firm defaults, it is assumed that bond-
holders or creditors get the remaining value (besides those that consider stra-
tegic default). This “wind-up” value coincides with the default threshold at
default. If we consider a situation with complete information about the asset
value and the default threshold, then the recovery rate is also a predictable
quantity. In the literature we reviewed, we came across two ways to deal with
the problem of these predictability effects. The predictability of default is
a result of the assumption of perfect knowledge or information about a com-
pany’s assets and debt. If we consider the real world, it is impossible to deduce
the value of the firm’s assets, Vt, its debt level, its asset’s volatility, σV , or the
default threshold simply by looking at the capital structure of the firm. In the
first approach, we assume that we have only incomplete information about the
firm’s asset process and its default level. This results in a model whereby the
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market can only determine a distribution function for these processes. This
makes default impossible to predict under these models. This approach is con-
sidered, among others, in Duffie and Lando (2001) and Jarrow and Protter
(2004).
The other way of dealing with this problem is to incorporate jumps in
the dynamics of the firm value. The result of this is that it allows for the
asset value of the firm to suddenly drop. These jumps (drops) can reduce the
distance to default (the gap between asset value and default threshold), or
even cause a default if the drop is big enough. The net result is that default
is no longer a predictable event. It can be observed that under these models,
short-term PDs do not tend to zero. This results in short-term credit spreads
which are higher than those which we observe under traditional FPM models.
Most of the literature agrees that these models also overestimate the credit
spread. Zhou (2001) and Hilberink and Rogers (2002) investigate the effects
of incorporating a jump process or a jump component into the asset value of a
firm. Zhou takes the method of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and extends it
by adding a lognormally distributed jump component. Hilberink and Rogers
(2002) researched the use of certain Levy processes to model the firm’s asset
value. They only considered processes that could only have downward jumps.
They implement this by extending the model of Leland (1994). The models
by Zhou (2001) and Hilberink and Rogers (2002) circumvent the problem of
the predictability of default.
Incorporating jumps in a model has an interesting consequence. It converts
the recovery payment at default into a random variable. This comes about as
the assets of the firm can jump or drop suddenly below the default threshold. If
the firm’s assets followed a diffusion process without the inclusion of any jump
processes, the value of the firm at default would be the debt value. Fouque
et al. (2006) investigates the use of introducing stochastic volatility in FPM.
The authors find that this extension results in increased short-term spreads.
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The last set of extensions we came across investigate liquidity and its effect
on credit spreads. Davydenko (2005) is critical of the traditional literature on
structural models as most authors do not consider liquidity reasons as a major
determinant of default. He indicates that firms with high funding costs are
more likely to default. The author uses a sample of American bond issuers
from 1996 to 2003 to show that liquidity shortages are likely to cause default
for firm, especially if the firm’s cost of external financing is high. Another
important part of Davydenko’s work is that he presents an argument and
evidence against the traditional structural model. He argues against the idea
that default is caused when the asset value crosses a particular debt threshold.
3.5 Information Content of Market Data for
CDS Spreads
Cao, Yu and Zhong (2010) investigate the relationship between CDS spreads
and option-implied volatility. To do this, the authors analyse a sizeable sample
of firms with both CDS and options data. Cao, Yu and Zhong (2010) observe
that a firm’s put option-implied volatility is better at explaining the variation
of Credit Default swap spreads over time than historical volatility. Cao, Yu
and Zhong (2010) argue that a CDS and an out-of-the-money put option are
similar, as they both offer protection against downside risk. Cremers et al.
(2008) further support this claim. Their paper introduces measures of volatil-
ity and jump risk that are based on individual stock options to explain credit
spreads on corporate bonds. They also show that implied volatilities of indi-
vidual options contain useful information for credit spreads.
Zhang et al. (2009) also investigate the relationship between CDS spreads
and volatility. In addition to this, they consider a firm’s stock price jump risk.
The authors then calibrate a Merton-type structural model that incorporates
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stochastic volatility and jumps. They find that their jump-diffusion stochastic
volatility model outperforms the alternative models in fitting the observed
credit spreads.
Chapter 4
Model Choices
After considering the extensions in Section 3, we now choose the models to
be implemented. The models selected should allow accurate estimation of
market CDS spreads using only equity data. The approach of Hull, Nelken
and White (2004) is most suitable. We extend their analysis one step further
by calculating CDS spreads instead of the usual credit spread. The section
below motivates the choice of this model. We also investigate an extension
to the First Passage Time (FPT) model of Black and Cox (1976) using the
approach of Hull, Nelken and White (2004).
4.1 Hull-Nelken-White Model
If we consider Merton’s model, it can be shown that a vanilla option on the
equity of a firm can be represented as a compound option on the company’s
assets. Geske (1977) provided a valuation formula for compound options. In
the paper by Hull, Nelken and White (2004), the authors use the work of
Geske to extend Merton’s model one step further. They demonstrate how the
credit spread in Merton’s model can be estimated from the implied volatilities
of equity options. We will now explain how they implement this.
As we have shown previously in equation 3.3, the equity of a firm can
be expressed as a call option on its assets if its dynamics can be described
4.1 Hull-Nelken-White Model 17
by equation 3.1. Following this, an option on the equity of a firm can be
expressed as a compound option. If you consider a put option and a CDS,
they both provide the holder with a form of downside protection. A put
option provides you with protection if the equity price drops sharply. A CDS
protects a bondholder in the event of a default. If the market anticipates a
default, we would expect stock prices to drop. The major reason for choosing
this model is that it links the options market to the credit market. Consider
the following payoff of a put option on a firm’s equity with maturity T :
max(K − ET , 0), (4.1)
where ET is a call option on the assets at T .
It should be noted that the call option on the assets or equity has an expiry,
T such that T > T . It can be shown, using the work by Geske (1977) together
with the Black-Scholes framework, that the price of such an option can be
expressed by the following equation:
p = De−rTBVN
−a2, d2;
√
T
T

− V0 BVN
−a1, d1;−
√
T
T
 (4.2)
+ Ke−rTΦ(−a2), (4.3)
where D is the debt level and
a1 =
ln
(
V0
V ∗
T
e−rT
)
+ 1
2
σ2V (T )
σV
√
T
(4.4)
a2 = a1 − σV
√
T . (4.5)
In the above equation, BVN is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution
function. V ∗
T
is the critical asset value at time T such that the equity value (i.e.
the call option on the firms’s assets) equals K. That is, V ∗
T
is the asset value
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below which the put option on the equity will be exercised. The expressions
for d1and d2 are listed in equations 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. We also express:
K = κE0e
rT (4.6)
V ∗
T
= αV0e
rT . (4.7)
It can be seen that α is the ratio of the critical asset price, V ∗
T
to the
forward asset price. Hull, Nelken and White (2004) refer to it as the implied
strike level. The parameter κ is the ratio of the option strike price to the
forward equity price and the authors refer to it as the option’s moneyness.
If vanilla option trades on the market, the market convention is to quote
the implied volatility of the option. The following equations for a put option
illustrate this:
P0 = Ke
−rTΦ(−d∗2)− E0Φ(−d∗1) (4.8)
= κE0Φ(−d∗2)− E0Φ(−d∗1),
where
d∗1 =
ln
(
erTE0
K
)
+ 1
2
v2(T )
v
√
T
=
ln (κ) + 1
2
v2(T )
v
√
T
(4.9)
d∗2 = d
∗
1 − v
√
T . (4.10)
If we have a market price, P0, we can solve for v. We denote the above put
option’s implied volatility by v.
We can now express a put option on a firms’s equity in two different ways.
If we set these two equations equal to one another and solve for the V ∗
T
, we
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can determine the volatility of the assets. As we can express V ∗
T
as αV0e
rT , we
can solve for α instead. The volatility of the assets, σV , together with implied
strike level, α, can be determined by solving the following set of equations:
κE0Φ(−d∗2)− E0Φ(−d∗1) = De−rTBV N
−a2, d2;
√
T
T

− V0BV N
−a1, d1;−
√
T
T

+ Ke−rTΦ(−a2) (4.11)
and
κE0e
rT = V ∗
T
Φ(d2,T )−De−r(T−T )Φ(d1,T )
= V ∗
T
[
Φ(d2,T )−
L
α
Φ(d1,T )
]
,
(4.12)
where L = De
rT
V0
(the leverage ratio) and
d1,T =
− ln (L
α
)
+ 1
2
σ2V (T − T )
σV
√
T − T
(4.13)
d2,T = d1,T − σV
√
T − T . (4.14)
Equation 4.11 is used to equate the two methods for pricing a put option
on the equity of the firm. Equation 4.12 is used to find α. Given σV , solving
this equation will give us a value for α such that the call option on the assets
(the equity) of the firm is equal to K. In other words, we are solving for the
critical value of the assets, V ∗
T
, such that a call option on the assets equals K.
Equation 4.12 is derived from the usual Black-Scholes equation for a vanilla
option. Equations 4.11 and 4.12 can be solved simultaneously to get values
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for α and σV . These two equations allow us to get a market consistent σV .
With the above pricing formula for a put option on a firm’s equity, we can now
relate the asset’s volatility σV to an implied volatility on the firms stock. After
solving for σV , we use equation 3.6 to determine the probability of default.
We chose this model as past research has shown there is a strong link
between equity option and the credit derivatives markets. This relationship
may allow one to get market consistent probabilities of default and CDS
spreads.
4.2 First Passage Time
We shall make use of the standard first passage time model by Black and Cox
(1976) with the calibration extension described in Section 4.1. This allows
us to determine two sets of probabilities and CDS spreads. This extension is
simple in nature. It involves calibrating σV to an implied volatility of a put
option on the names’s stock in the same way as we have described in section
4.1. We then use this estimate of σV to calculate the probability of default
using equation 3.9.
Chapter 5
Empirical Investigation
To evaluate the suitability of our model, we conducted an empirical investig-
ation. We used the models to calculate the probabilities of default for a set of
firms. These PDs were used together with the appropriate discount curves to
calculate CDS spreads. In the section below, the methodology is explained in
detail. The results are presented at the end of the section.
5.1 Data
All the data needed for the calculations was collected from Bloomberg. Data
was collected for selected American, European and South African Stocks. The
credit worthiness for the firms listed in Table 5.1 was investigated:
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Firm’s Name Ticker S&P Rating
The Goldman Sachs Group Inc GS A-
JPMorgan Chase & Co JPM A
AK Steel Holding Corp AKS B
Telefonica SA TEF BBB
Target Corp TGT A+
British Petroleum BP A
FirstRand Ltd FSR BBB
BHP Billiton PLC BHP A+
Standard Bank Group Ltd SBK BBB
Tab. 5.1: List of firms together with their S&P credit rating as at November
2013.
The period of investigation was from 1 January 2013 to 31 October 2013.
For each European and American stock, we downloaded CDS spreads for each
business day in the period. We used five-year CDS quotes in our analysis. For
each firm, implied volatility surfaces were also downloaded for the first business
day of each month. For the South African firms, volatility surfaces were only
available from April to September. Balance sheets were retrieved for each firm
on the list and were used to calculate the debt outstanding and the asset value
per share. As per the ISDA CDS valuation model, ISDA CDS fixing swap
curves were downloaded for both the American and European markets for the
concerned period. South African swap curves were downloaded to value the
South African stocks’ CDS spreads.
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5.2 Methodology
After all the data for the investigation was collected the probabilities of default
were calculated for each firm. For each firm, we calculated the asset per share,
V0, and debt per share, D. This was done by dividing the total assets and
total liabilities, respectively, by the number of shares outstanding for each
firm. The risk free rate, r, was chosen from the appropriate swap curve so
that it had the same tenor as the option. To calculate the asset volatility we
used the approach of Hull, Nelken and White (2004). To do this, we used 80
percent out-the-money put options. These options were chosen as they were
the furthest out-the-money put options available with data for all the stocks.
To solve equations 4.11 and 4.12, we used Matlab’s fsolve. This function
allows one to solve two non-linear simultaneous equations. As inputs, it takes
the set of equations as well as the initial estimates for the two parameters being
solved for. We performed this analysis for various tenors of the 80 per cent out-
the-money put options. This was consistent with what was done in previous
research. As we show later in the findings section, the implied volatility of
these options and the CDS spreads for a particular firm are highly correlated.
It is important to note that the asset volatility, σV , is then calculated for
different tenors to create a volatility skew. This is done by solving equations
4.11 and 4.12 for different values of T . We then proceeded to calculate the
probability of default. Two sets of probabilities were calculated. To calcu-
late the Merton probabilities we used equation 3.6 and to calculate the first
passage time (FPT) probabilities we used equation 3.9. PDs were calculated
for each year from 1 to 5 for each method i.e. PDT = P [ Time of default
< T ] for T ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. It is important to note that these are cumulative
probabilities of default. Below is an example for Goldman Sachs:
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T PDt
1 0.000655
2 0.043568
3 0.067241
4 0.101715
5 0.111123
Tab. 5.2: An example of PDs calculated using the Merton model for Goldman
Sachs for May 2013 using a 3 month option.
Thereafter, we proceed to calculate probabilities of default for each quarter.
We first create a hazard rate term structure, by finding out the hazard rate
for each of the 5 years. The hazard rate λt is given by:
λt =
ln(St)
−t , (5.1)
where St the survival probability is given by St = 1− PDt.
t λt
1 0.000655
2 0.022273
3 0.023203
4 0.026817
5 0.023559
Tab. 5.3: May 2013 Goldman Sachs annual Merton hazard rates.
We assumed the hazard rates remained constant over each year and then
calculated the probabilities of default for each quarter using the following equa-
tion:
1− PDt = exp(λt t). (5.2)
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Table 5.4 below illustrates this.
With these PDs, we then proceeded to calculate the CDS spread for each
name. To do this we need to “strip” the required swap curves. This was
done by coding up a curve stripper for US, European and South African swap
curves. As per the ISDA model for US and European CDSs, the ISDA CDS
fixing swap curves were used. The following equation was used to calculate
the CDS spread for a name:
spread =
∑
St−1(PDt − PDt−1)B(0, t) (1− REC)∑
τStB(0, t)
, (5.3)
where REC is the recovery rate set at the outset of the CDS, B(0, t) is the
discount factor from time t to time zero and τ is the fraction of the year between
reset dates. The formula is derived by equating the cash flows for the premium
leg of the CDS to the cash flows of the protection leg. The numerator of the
formula represents the protection leg. The term St−1(PDt−PDt−1) represents
the probability of surviving to the start of the period and then defaulting in
that period. The denominator represents the protection leg of the CDS. This
spread is calculated for both sets of probabilities (Merton and FPT) and then
compared to the observed spreads in the market.
In summary, we solve equations 4.11 and 4.12 for different implied volatil-
ities and tenors. For each of the 6 US and European firms and each time point
(first business day of each month) we calculate:
• An asset volatility skew with the 3 month implied volatility as an input;
• An asset volatility skew with the 6 month implied volatility as an input;
• For each model PDs out to 5 years for both the 3 month and 6 month
implied volatilities; and
• CDS spreads for each model.
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t λt PDt
0.25 0.0007 0.000164
0.5 0.0007 0.000327
0.75 0.0007 0.000491
1 0.0007 0.000655
1.25 0.0223 0.027457
1.5 0.0223 0.032857
1.75 0.0223 0.038227
2 0.0223 0.043568
2.25 0.0232 0.050867
2.5 0.0232 0.056356
2.75 0.0232 0.061814
3 0.0232 0.067241
3.25 0.0268 0.083465
3.5 0.0268 0.089589
3.75 0.0268 0.095673
4 0.0268 0.101715
4.25 0.0236 0.095277
4.5 0.0236 0.10059
4.75 0.0236 0.105872
5 0.0236 0.111123
Tab. 5.4: May 2013 Quarterly Merton PDs and hazard rates for Goldman
Sachs.
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5.3 Results
In this section, we present the results observed after performing the calculation
for the US and European stocks. The results for the South African stocks will
be presented in a later section as there were no observable CDS quotes for
these stocks.
5.3.1 Relationship between Implied Volatility and
CDS spreads
The correlation between CDS spreads and implied volatility was observed to be
0.974. This indicates that there is a strong relationship between CDS spreads
and implied volatilities. Below is a scatter plot of all the US and European
stocks CDS spreads versus their implied volatilities.
Fig. 5.1: Illustration of the correlation between CDS spreads and implied
volatilities (3 and 6 month).
For names with a high CDS spread, we observe high implied volatility for
their options. This indicates that put options on this name, as well as CDS
spreads, will both be expensive which may be as a result of the increased risk
of default. As both credit default swaps and put options provide downside
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protection, this is as expected.
5.3.2 Asset Volatility
Before we calculate the probabilities of default, we need to determine the asset
volatility (σV ) structure. This is done by solving equations 4.11 and 4.12 using
Matlab. Figure 5.2 shows how the volatility changes over time for BP. We can
see the short term volatility is higher than the longer term volatility. We also
observe that the asset volatility is generally higher when using the 3 month
volatility as an input for solving equations 4.11 and 4.12. This is a consequence
of implied volatilities generally decreasing as the tenor of the out-the-money
put option decreases. This decreasing asset volatility has an effect on the
probabilities of default.
Fig. 5.2: Asset volatility over time for BP.
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5.3.3 Probabilities of Default
To calculate the above CDS spreads for both models, we need to calculate
the probabilities of default. This is done by using equation 3.6 and 3.9. We
observe that the probabilities calculated using the Merton Model are generally
lower than the probabilities calculated using the FPT model. As the volatility
decreases over time, this creates a problem as it allows for cumulative prob-
abilities of default that are not strictly increasing over time. This problem is
overcome by making the assumption of a constant hazard rate over each year
and restricting PDt−PDt−1 to positive values. An example of the probabilities
of default is presented in the Section 5.2; we will not present any here.
5.3.4 Merton CDS spreads
Here we present the results relating to the CDS spreads calculated using the
Merton model. We will refer to CDS spreads calculated using probabilities
from the Merton model as “Merton CDS spreads”. The same applies for the
FPT model. It can be seen below that the Merton CDS spreads are highly
correlated with the market CDS spread. The correlation between Market CDS
spreads and all the Merton CDS spreads was 0.850. The 3 month implied
volatility based spreads have a higher correlation with the market rates than
the 6 month implied volatility based spreads.
Correlation
3 month CDS 0.890
6 month CDS 0.811
3 and 6 month CDS 0.850
Tab. 5.5: The correlation between the calculated Merton spreads and the
market spreads.
It was noted that although the Merton model CDS spreads were accur-
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ate for most firms, it did overestimate the spread for BP and TGT. This is
indicated by the scatter on the lower right hand side of Figure 5.3.
Fig. 5.3: A scatter plot of the Merton CDS spreads vs the market CDS
spreads for all firms.
If we take a look at some of the individual firm’s results, we see that there is
a difference between using the 3 month and 6 month option implied volatility
when calculating the CDS spreads. This effect varies by firms and this is
illustrated in the two figures below. The 6 month implied volatility spreads
are higher than the market spreads for AKS while they are lower than the
market spreads for GS.
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Fig. 5.4: The Merton CDS spreads using the 3 and 6 month volatility for AK
Steel over the investigation period.
Fig. 5.5: The Merton CDS spreads using the 3 and 6 month volatility for
Goldman Sachs over the investigation period.
The above figures show that when using the Merton model with implied
volatility to calibrate the model, it produces spreads which are comparable
to market CDS spreads. Overall, the results are encouraging. Although the
model generally overestimates the spread, it sometimes falls below the market
spread. To conclude our analysis of this model we regress all the Merton CDS
spreads (both the 3 and 6 month implied volatility based CDS spreads) against
the market CDS spreads. We also set the intercept term to 0. The β coefficient
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for this model is 0.801. This indicates that the model provides a fairly good
estimate, although it overestimates the spread by around 25 per cent. The
ideal β coefficient would be 1. Also the R2 is fairly high, indicating that most
of the variability in the market CDS spreads is explained by the Merton model.
β Coefficient 0.801
R2 0.812
t stat 22.475
p-value 4.07341E-43
Tab. 5.6: Summary of the regression of the Merton CDS spreads against the
market CDS spreads.
5.3.5 FPT CDS spreads
As in the previous section we present the results relating to the calculated
CDS spreads using the FPT model. Although the FPT CDS spreads are
correlated with the market CDS spreads, the relationship is not as strong
at the relationship with the Merton model. The correlation between market
spreads and all the FPT spreads was 0.695. In this case the 3 month implied
volatility based spreads have a lower correlation with the market rates than
the 6 month implied volatility based spreads.
Correlation
3 month CDS 0.681
6 month CDS 0.711
3 and 6 month CDS 0.695
Tab. 5.7: The correlation between the calculated FPT spreads and the mar-
ket spreads.
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Fig. 5.6: A scatter plot of the FPT CDS spreads vs the market CDS spreads
for all firms besides AK Steel.
The FPT model tends to overestimate the CDS spread and this can be
seen in the above figure. The reason AK Steel’s results were omitted from the
diagram is that the FPT model produced very large CDS spreads. Including
them in the diagram would distort the scatter plot.
As the FPT model allows default to occur at any point it time and not just
at maturity, we would expect to observe larger spread for this model. This
is since the probabilities of default would be higher for the FPT model than
the Merton model. Taking a look at the results for Telefonica and Goldman
Sachs, we can see this effect of the higher probabilities of default.
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Fig. 5.7: The FPT CDS spreads using the 3 month volatility for Telefonica
over the investigation period.
Fig. 5.8: The FPT CDS spreads using the 3 month volatility for Goldman
Sachs over the investigation period.
Another observation was the volatility of the spreads for some stocks. This
can be observed in the figure below for JP Morgan. The results for both
implied volatilities are presented.
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Fig. 5.9: The FPT CDS spreads using the 3 and 6 month volatility for JP
Morgan over the investigation period.
Finally as with the previous model we regress all the FPT CDS spreads
(both the 3 and 6 month implied volatility based CDS spreads) against the
market CDS spreads. Note that β is far lower for this model, which indicates
that the model overestimates the spread. This may indicate that the relation-
ship between the two data sets is not as strong as that relationship observed
for the Merton model. Also, the R2 is lower, indicating that lower amount of
the variability in the market CDS spread is explained by the FPT model.
β Coefficient 0.121
R2 0.714
t stat 16.659
p-value 5.68139E-32
Tab. 5.8: Summary of the regression of the FPT CDS spreads against the
market CDS spreads.
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5.3.6 South African Firms
To conclude our empirical investigation, we apply the same methodology de-
scribed in Section 5.2 to three South African firms, First Rand (FSR), Standard
Bank (SBK) and BHP Billiton PLC (BIL). The major difference is that, in
South Africa, we could not obtain CDS prices for the firms. This is because
there is no developed CDS market in South Africa. In Figure 5.10 we graph
the spreads obtained for the two South Africa banks we investigated.
Fig. 5.10: The 3 month implied volatility based Merton CDS spreads for the
South African firms.
Again we noted that the FPT model produced spreads that were higher
than those produced by the Merton Model. In the table below, we present
the result for both models when using the 3 month implied volatility in the
calibration process.
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Merton FPT
BIL SBK FSR BIL SBK FSR
04/01/2013 699.14 173.21 60.28 1080.03 262.17 99.64
05/01/2013 702.87 167.27 56.63 1089.08 250.98 93.82
06/03/2013 670.73 170.67 72.93 1032.77 256.72 123.00
07/01/2013 705.96 159.81 73.99 1094.91 240.23 123.96
08/01/2013 676.02 166.60 75.48 1042.06 251.30 126.48
09/03/2013 667.17 163.81 77.48 1026.38 247.72 129.63
Tab. 5.9: The CDS spreads for the South African stocks.
Chapter 6
Findings
After performing the calculations above, we can now analyse the performance
of each model. First, it is important to note the relationship between option
implied volatilities and CDS spreads. We can see that when CDS spreads are
high we can expect to find high option implied volatilities for put options on
the firms stock. This is because high implied volatilities correspond to high
prices for their put options. Both put options and CDS provide downside
protection, so we expect there to be some correlation between the two. This
is encouraging as we calibrated our models using this option implied volatility.
This calibration choice was made to try to ensure a set of probabilities that
were market consistent.
We also observed that the asset volatilities we calculated decreased as the
tenor of the compound option (i.e. the debt) increased. As the asset volatility
was generally higher at the short term, we sometimes observed cumulative
PDs that were not strictly increasing over time. On the odd occasion, when
solving for the asset volatility using Matlab, we did not find a solution for the
equations. This could have distorted some of the results. However, for stocks
such as AKS, GS, JPM, SBK, FSR, BIL, all the equations had solutions.
The calculated probabilities of default could not be compared to any market
observable data. When comparing the calculated probabilities to the S&P
probabilities we observe that they are higher than the historical default rates.
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We also note that the PDs calculated using the FPT model are higher than
those calculated by the Merton model. This was expected as the Merton model
only allows for default at the maturity of the debt.
It is clear that the probabilities calculated using the Merton model result
in CDS spreads that are more consistent with market CDS spreads. The
CDS spreads calculated using the 3 month implied volatility provide the best
estimates. The Merton model produces relatively stable results, although, on
average, it slightly overestimates the spread. For all the firms besides BP and
Target Corporation the model produced spreads in line with the market. A
possible reason for BP’s Merton CDS spreads being higher than the market
may be a result of the company understating its assets (oil reserves) on its
balance sheet.
The FPT model, on the other hand, did not perform as well. The results
of the regression analysis support this claim. Although it did provide spreads
that were comparable to the market spreads, the model overestimated the CDS
spreads. We also note that the model produced CDS spreads for some stocks
that were volatile.
When we apply the model to the South African stocks, we find that the
spreads for the banks were consistent with those of the American Banks. We
again note that the FPT model produces higher spreads than the Merton
model.
Chapter 7
Discussion and Conclusions
The aim of this dissertation was to provide a method to calculate market con-
sistent CDS spreads using market or equity data. The idea for this dissertation
stemmed from the need to estimate probabilities of default in the market where
there was no data available relating to defaults and default rates. We thus con-
ducted a review of credit models to find a method whereby one could estimate
probabilities of default from equity data. The obvious connection between the
equity market and the bond market was that of put option and credit default
swaps. A put option provides the holder of the option with some downside
protection by guaranteeing a minimum price at which one could sell a specific
stock in the future. A CDS provides a guarantee that one will receive at least
the recovery value (set at the outset of the CDS) of the debt in the event of
default. In the event of a decrease in credit quality, we would expect equity
prices to drop sharply. If we follow this theory, we should expect CDS spreads
and option implied volatility to be correlated. This theory was supported by
the Section 5.3.1. The implied volatilities may also allow us to capture some
of the premiums in the CDS spread which are not attributable to default risk,
such as liquidity and market risk. A possible reason for the correlation between
put options and CDS spreads is that banks are hedging credit derivatives with
equity derivatives.
The calibration extension proposed by Hull, Nelken and White (2004) made
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use of this relationship. We applied this extension to the standard Merton and
FPT models. After performing an investigation of these models, we noted that
the Merton model outperforms the FPT model. The main reason for this is
that the FPT model overestimates the probability of default compared to the
market. This is because the FPT model allows for default to occur before the
maturity of the debt. On the other hand, The probabilities generated by the
Merton model resulted in spreads that were similar to those which we observed
in the market. It is important to note that these results were calculated in a
post 2008 credit crisis environment where CDS spreads have risen. In South
Africa, where the CDS market is not as developed as Europe and America
such a method would be a useful. Although, we should also note that the
options market is South Africa lacks liquidity. Overall, we can conclude that
the implied volatility skews are potentially useful as predictors of probabilities
of default.
There are a few possible extensions that can be made. Firstly, the money-
ness of the options together with its tenor could be varied to determine its effect
on predicting the CDS spread of a name. As the time period we considered
was limited this investigation could be extended over a larger period of time.
In particular, we could perform this investigation over the credit crisis period
between 2008 and 2009. It could also be useful to investigate the possibility
of a lag effect of information reaching the bond and stock markets at different
times. Lastly, the other obvious major extension would be to consider more
stocks.
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